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A number of philosophers in recent years have maintained that H.L.A. Hart in The Concept of Law propounded an expressivist account of the semantics of the legal statements that are uttered from the internal viewpoint of the people who run the institutions of legal governance in any jurisdiction.  Although the primary aim of this article is to attack the attribution of that semantic doctrine to Hart, the article will begin with some metaphysical matters – the matters of reductionism and naturalism – that often lie behind the development of expressivist approaches to the semantics of normative discourse.  After briefly exploring those metaphysical concerns (to which I will return later), the article will begin its main discussion by rehearsing the distinction between the semantics and the pragmatics of utterances.  It will then delineate the doctrine of expressivism which the aforementioned philosophers have in mind when they ascribe that doctrine to Hart.  Although I will make reference to a few such philosophers, I will focus chiefly on an article by Kevin Toh that has been the fountainhead of all the subsequent attributions of expressivism to Hart.  As will be argued herein, Toh and like-minded philosophers have gone astray in imputing to Hart a semantic version of expressivism.  Notwithstanding that Hart’s theory of law can aptly be characterized as expressivist, that characterization is appropriate only when expressivism is understood as an account of the pragmatics of legal statements rather than as an account of their semantics.

1.  Was Hart a Reductionist?

During the past couple of decades, some philosophers have submitted that Hart in The Concept of Law was engaged in a reductionist project.  Such a view has been expressed most bluntly by Andrei Marmor, who proclaims that “Hart’s main objective in The Concept of Law was not essentially different from that of Austin, namely, to provide a reductionist theory of law” (2013, 209).  To assess this contention by Marmor, we shall obviously need to gain a clear sense of what he means by “reductionist.”
	Immediately after the sentence just quoted, Marmor supplies his initial gloss on his invocation of reductionism: “The main purpose of Hart’s theory was to offer an explanation of law in terms of something more foundational in nature, that is, in terms of social facts, which, in turn, can be explained by reference to people’s actual conduct, beliefs, and attitudes” (2013, 209).  Given that Marmor is here elaborating on his characterization of Hart’s theory as reductionist, he is presuming that the reduction of some phenomenon X to some other phenomenon Y consists in establishing the explanatory priority of Y over X.  If a theory explains X fully by reference to Y and not vice versa, then the theory has reduced X to Y – or so this initial conception of reductionism suggests.  Concomitant to that explanatory conception of reductionism is a metaphysical conception that is signaled by the wording about “something more foundational in nature.”  That is, Marmor here assumes that the reduction of X to Y consists in showing that Y is metaphysically deeper than X.  Patently, anyone propounding such a conception of reductionism will need to elucidate the nature of the metaphysical priority of Y over X.
	Both of these intimately related understandings of reductionism are operative in Marmor’s essay as it unfolds.  When Marmor embarks upon his principal discussion of the reductionist character of Hart’s theorizing, he virtually echoes the statements that have been quoted above: “Hart clearly shared Austin’s view that a theoretical explanation of the nature of law should explain what the law is in terms of social facts, facts that can be explained by more foundational truths about how people behave, the kind of beliefs they have about their conduct, and the kind of attitudes and dispositions that tend to accompany those shared beliefs.”  He continues: “In other words, the hallmark of Hart’s theory is the idea that social rules are at the foundations of law, and that social rules, in turn, can be explained reductively in terms of people’s actual conduct, beliefs, and attitudes” (2013, 214).
	Still, none of these statements so far has shed much light on the specifics of the metaphysical priority which Marmor has in mind when he talks of reducing law to social facts about people’s conduct and attitudes and beliefs.  After wisely denying that Hart was pursuing a project of semantic reductionism – whereby all statements expressed in legal terms could be fully replaced with statements formulated in the terms of some other discipline such as social psychology – Marmor expands slightly, though only slightly, on the type of metaphysical priority that he envisages.  He declares that the reductionism endorsed by Hart and other legal positivists is centered on “a metaphysical or constitutive form of reduction.  The idea of a metaphysical reduction is to show that a distinct type of phenomenon is actually constituted by, and fully reducible to, some other, more foundational type of phenomenon.”  Having introduced the notion of a constitutive relationship that obtains between a metaphysically deep phenomenon and any phenomenon that is reducible to it, however, Marmor returns to his invocation of explanatory priority: “In [Hart’s] case, the idea is to show that law is constituted by social practices that can be fully explained by the way people actually behave, the kind of beliefs they share about their behavior, and the attitudes and dispositions that they exhibit in the relevant contexts” (2013, 216).  Marmor makes a few further such remarks, but none of them is more informative than those that have already been quoted.  Hence, he has not specified what a constitutive relationship is, nor has he told us why a relationship of constitutive priority or explanatory priority between Y and X is suitably characterized as the reducibility of X to Y.
	These lacunae in Marmor’s discussion are significant, since we cannot assess his attribution of a reductionist methodology to Hart until we know the kind of reductionism that is being invoked.  We know of course that Marmor is not contemplating any semantic reductionism, but quite unclear are the specifics of the metaphysical reductionism which he is contemplating.  Let us, then, mull over a couple of possibilities.
	Marmor almost certainly does not have in mind a merely causal relationship between Y and X, for causal relationships are ordinarily contrasted with constitutive relationships.  Moreover, the sheer fact that Y causes X is hardly in itself a basis for the conclusion that X is reducible to Y (under any plausible conception of reducibility, and under any plausible conception of causation).  Accordingly, much more likely is that Marmor is envisioning a constitutive relationship of the following type.  X is fully constituted by Y if and only if Y, in combination with all the prevailing circumstances other than any causal laws, logically entails X.
	Suppose for example that John and Tony are the sole competitors in a two-mile race, and that John finishes the race ahead of Tony without having contravened any rules of the competition.  His having finished ahead of Tony, in combination with all the prevailing circumstances other than any causal laws, logically entails his having won the race.  Indeed, his having finished ahead of Tony – in combination with all the prevailing circumstances other than any causal laws – amounts to his having won the race.  Among the prevailing circumstances, of course, are the rules of the race which specify the conditions for winning.  Likewise among those prevailing circumstances is the fact that John has not contravened any of the applicable rules.
	When Marmor asserts that the reducibility of X to Y involves a constitutive relationship between Y and X, he may well be invoking the notion of constitutiveness in the sense just outlined.  If so, he is attributing to Hart the view that – in combination with the prevailing circumstances other than any causal laws – certain behavioral patterns and beliefs and dispositions on the part of legal officials and citizens logically entail the existence and operations and norms of a legal system.  The attribution of such a view to Hart is well founded, but much more doubtful is whether that view is appositely classifiable as “reductionist.”  Of course, Marmor might simply stipulate that the term “reductionist” applies to any theory which postulates a constitutive relationship of the kind just indicated.  Though Hart did indeed propound a model of law that is reductionist in the stipulated sense, the appropriateness of any such stipulation is precisely what is in question here.  If a stipulation is highly misleading, it should be eschewed.  Yet the application of the “reductionist” label to Hart’s jurisprudential theory would indeed be highly misleading – since that label would strongly convey the impression that legal norms (as items supposedly reducible to some other set of phenomena) are not to be counted in an overall reckoning of entities that exist and events that occur.
I will here apply the designation “Not Counted Thesis” to the proposition that any phenomenon constituted by some other phenomenon or set of phenomena is not to be counted in any overall reckoning of entities that exist and events that occur.  To understand the Not Counted Thesis and to see why it is inapposite in application to legal norms, we should first ponder a scenario to which that thesis is germanely applicable, and we should then ponder a different scenario to which the thesis does not pertinently apply.  Each of those scenarios involves a constitutive relationship.  While probing each of them, we shall in effect be inquiring whether a constitutive relationship is non-misleadingly classifiable as a relationship of reducibility.
	The first scenario is the race between John and Tony broached in the antepenultimate paragraph above.  Given the prevailing circumstances other than any causal laws, John’s having finished the race ahead of Tony is constitutive of his having won the race.  Now, when we bring to bear the Not Counted Thesis on John’s accomplishment, it diagnoses the situation correctly.  John’s having finished the race ahead of Tony and his having won the race are not two separate events that are each to be counted in an overall reckoning of events that have occurred.  Rather, they are one and the same event under two somewhat different descriptions.  As I have said above, John’s having finished the race ahead of Tony amounts to his having won the race.  Hence, we would be guilty of double counting if we were to include both the winning and the finishing ahead of Tony as items in a register of events that have occurred.  Only the latter item is to be included.  In this situation, the constitutive relationship between John’s finishing the race ahead of Tony and his winning the race is aptly classifiable as a relationship of reducibility.
	Now let us think about a multitude of communicative actions over time that cumulatively constitute a natural language such as English.  The communicative actions and dispositions of the users of the language (including their actions of compiling dictionaries and grammatical treatises, for example), in combination with the prevailing circumstances other than any causal laws, are collectively constitutive of the language and its sundry rules of syntax and semantics.  Should we conclude, then, that those rules of syntax and semantics are not to be counted in any overall reckoning of entities that exist and events that occur?  Given that the multifarious communicative actions and dispositions of the users of the language are to be counted in such a reckoning, would we be guilty of double counting if we also included the syntactic and semantic rules that are constituted by those actions and dispositions?  As should be evident, the answer to each of these questions is negative.  Although the communicative actions and shared dispositions of the users of a language do constitute the language’s semantic and syntactic rules in the sense that has been specified here, they are also oriented toward those rules – for the rules guide and structure the very actions and dispositions that sustain them.​[1]​  We would be missing the reciprocality of this process of constitution and guidance if we declined to include the rules of syntax and semantics along with the communicative actions and dispositions in an overall reckoning of entities that exist and events that occur.  Whereas John’s winning the race and John’s finishing ahead of Tony are one and the same event under slightly different descriptions, the communicative actions and dispositions of the users of a language are not exactly the same things as the rules of syntax and semantics that are constituted by those actions and dispositions.  Hence, the constitutive relationship between the actions and dispositions on the one hand and the rules on the other hand is not aptly classifiable as a relationship of reducibility.
	Of course, the rules of syntax and semantics are abstract normative entities rather than material entities.  They are immanent in the communicative practices of which they are the normative structure and lodestars.  They guide those practices not by serving as causal mechanisms but instead by serving as foci for the exercise of people’s linguistic competences.  Still, in any satisfactory overall reckoning of entities that exist and events that occur, we have to take account of normative entities as well as of material entities.
	Let us, then, turn to the norms of a legal system.  As has been readily granted, Hart took the view that the norms of a legal system are constituted by certain behavioral patterns and beliefs and dispositions of officials and citizens (in combination with the prevailing circumstances other than any causal laws).  Is that constitutive relationship relevantly similar to the relationship between John’s finishing ahead of Tony and John’s winning the race, or is it relevantly similar instead to the relationship between the communicative actions and dispositions on the one hand and the rules of syntax and semantics on the other hand?  In other words, is it a relationship of reducibility or not?  Pace Marmor, the answer to this question is that the constitutive relationship which Hart envisaged is not aptly classifiable as a relationship of reducibility.  As every reader of The Concept of Law is aware, Hart repeatedly assailed John Austin for obfuscating the crucial role played by norms in undergirding and structuring the operations of any legal system.
Marmor persistently contends that “Hart’s own theory of law is as reductionist as Austin’s” (2013, 214).  Such an assertion is true if the term “reductionist” simply denotes a theory which recounts a constitutive relationship between phenomena, but the assertion is false if Marmor is implying that Hart aligned himself with Austin by obscuring the reality and centrality of norms in the workings of legal systems.  Far from obscuring the reality of the norms in such systems – that is, far from suggesting that those norms are not to be included in any overall reckoning of entities that exist – Hart again and again insisted that we shall not understand the nature of law unless we grasp that legal systems are systems of norms.  Although those norms are constituted by the actions and beliefs and attitudes of officials and citizens, they are operative in guiding the very actions and beliefs and attitudes that sustain them, and they are operative in enabling the composition of legal institutions.  Given that Hart laid stress on these guiding and enabling roles of norms, the epithet “reductionist” in application to his theorizing is highly misleading at best.  Hart recognized that the constituting of legal norms by actions and beliefs and attitudes is fully consistent with the fact that the norms are not simply the actions and beliefs and attitudes under a different description.

2.  A Naturalistic Ambition?

My response to Marmor might elicit dissatisfaction among some other legal philosophers, for in recent years some such philosophers have attributed to Hart a starkly naturalistic position.  In other words, these philosophers have submitted that Hart denied the reality of any entities that are not causally efficacious.  Since abstract normative entities are not causally efficacious, these philosophers are contending that Hart denied the reality of legal norms.
	The ascription of such a view to Hart has been undertaken most assertively by Brian Leiter, though Leiter states the ascription principally with reference to moral norms.  He writes that “Kelsen and Hart, as everyone knows, were both metaphysical anti-realists about moral norms: that is, they denied that such norms had any objective existence, they denied that the best metaphysical account of what the world contains would include facts about what is morally right and wrong” (2011, 671).  Leiter subsequently refers to “an anti-realism about norms, which Hart accepts” (2011, 671-2, emphasis in original).  Stephen Perry similarly affirms that “[d]espite Hart’s rejection of his predecessors’ sanction- and prediction-based theories of law, he nonetheless shared their commitments to naturalism and empiricism” (2009, 311).  Toh likewise claims that Hart strove for “an account of…legal discourse that is congruent with the naturalistic conception of the world,” and Toh remarks that any partisan of the naturalistic conception is “loath to countenance properties that do not figure in our explanations in natural and social sciences” (2005, 84, 80).  In much the same vein, Scott Shapiro declares that Hart harbored an “impulse to make room for law in the natural world.  Hart, therefore, proposed an account of legal semantics that attempted to make legal language naturalistically reputable” (2006, 1168).
	Before we can come to grips with these pronouncements, a bit of elucidation is necessary.  When Leiter uses the phrase “objective existence,” he appears to be referring specifically to strongly mind-independent existence.  The occurrence of some event or the continued existence of some entity is strongly mind-independent if and only if it does not hinge on the mental functioning of any members of any group either individually or collectively (Kramer 2009, 26).
Now, although the bearings of Hart’s views concerning the nature of morality were not as clear-cut as Leiter suggests with his phrase “as everyone knows,” Hart did usually cleave to the notion that the correct principles of morality are not strongly mind-independent.​[2]​  Much more clearly, he aptly held that the continued existence of legal norms is not strongly mind-independent; were all creatures with minds to go permanently out of existence, legal norms too would cease to exist.  Instead of being strongly mind-independent, the continued existence of general legal norms is weakly mind-independent.  That is, the continued existence of such norms is not dependent on the mental activity of any particular individual.  Still, although the mind-independence of the continued existence of any general legal norms is weak rather than strong, there is no basis for the conclusion that such norms are to be omitted from an overall reckoning of entities that exist and events that occur (a reckoning which Leiter somewhat tendentiously labels as “the best metaphysical account of what the world contains”).  Moreover, as I have already maintained, there is no basis for saddling Hart with such a conclusion.
Given that Leiter is talking about moral norms rather than about legal norms in my main quotation from him above, he might not seem to be saying anything that is inconsistent with what I have just said about legal norms.  However, he appears there to be inferring the unreality of moral norms from the premise that their continued existence is not strongly mind-independent.  Since the continued existence of legal norms is indeed not strongly mind-independent, Leiter would presumably draw a parallel inference about their unreality.  Such an inference would be in keeping with the pugnaciously naturalistic outlook to which he subscribes throughout his writings, whereby he takes causal efficacy to be the hallmark of entities that are real.
Having elsewhere mounted quite a lengthy critique of Leiter’s naturalism (2009, 199-207) – with particular strictures on his failure to differentiate between supernatural entities such as gods and non-natural entities such as moral principles – I will not here recapitulate my objections to his general stance.  Instead, the key point for my present purposes is that no sweepingly naturalistic outlook can credibly be imputed to Hart in connection with questions about the reality of legal norms.  Hart repeatedly asserted the reality of such norms and repeatedly presupposed their reality.  While he fully recognized that the continued existence of general legal norms is only weakly mind-independent and that those norms are constituted by the behavior and dispositions and attitudes of officials in the manner outlined in §1 above, he roundly affirmed that such norms guide and structure and enable the operations of any legal system.  Legal norms can perform those guiding and structuring and enabling functions not by virtue of being endowed with causal efficacy, but instead by virtue of human capacities to reason about normative matters.
Hart undertook his jurisprudential ruminations in a period before minimalist theories of truth and reality had become as prominent as they are today, but he would very likely have been attracted to such theories if he had written in a later era.​[3]​  In other words, he would – for example – have postulated the logical equivalence of (1) a proposition affirming that a legal prohibition on murder really does exist in some jurisdiction J and (2) a proposition affirming that murder is legally proscribed in J.  When the reality or existence of legal norms is understood in this minimalist fashion, which obviously extends mutatis mutandis to laws with any contents, there are no grounds whatsoever for doubting that such norms can and do really exist.  One’s recognition of their reality is not “unscientific” in any way.  Hart was right to insist that such norms are to be included in any overall reckoning of entities that exist, and he was therefore right to espouse a position that is not pertinently classifiable as “reductionist.”


3.  The Semantics/Pragmatics Distinction

In the present context, the distinction between semantics and pragmatics can roughly be encapsulated as a contrast between what statements mean and why statements are uttered – a contrast between what a statement is about and what purpose or function is served by the articulation of it.  Both the meanings of statements and the purposes served by the utterance of statements are multifarious, of course.  Some purposes are operative in nearly all contexts in which statements of certain types are articulated, whereas others are highly context-specific.  Some purposes are sweepingly general or abstract, whereas others are more fine-grained and nuanced.  Some are consciously and carefully pursued, whereas others are largely taken for granted.  Some are quite evident to virtually every competent participant in the modes of communication through which they are fulfilled, whereas others are more subtle.  Similarly diverse are the meanings conveyed by statements, of course.  Those meanings differ in their degrees of generality and, mutatis mutandis, in the sundry other ways in which the purposes or functions of utterances can differ.  Partly because the purposes or functions of communicative activity are so heterogeneous, and because the meanings of the statements made in such activity are likewise so heterogeneous, the distinction between semantics and pragmatics is often complicated and elusive.  Still, the distinction is quite straightforward in numerous contexts, and it is crucial for any adequate understanding of Hart’s philosophy of law.
	Elsewhere (2018, chap. 4), I have found fault with Hart for his overemphasis on semantic matters in his account of legal interpretation and for his relative inattentiveness there to matters of pragmatics.  Here my reason for broaching that distinction afresh is quite different.  As I have very readily granted in my earlier exposition, Hart in his overall theorizing about law – rather than in his specific account of interpretation – was perspicaciously attuned to the intricacies and import of the pragmatics of legal discourse.  Indeed, his explorations of the pragmatics of such discourse have profoundly influenced nearly every subsequent theory in the philosophy of law.  As will be contended here, those explorations encompass all the aspects of Hart’s theorizing which Toh and like-minded exegetes have passed off as an analysis of the semantics of internal legal statements.  Hence, far from continuing to reproach Hart for his neglect of pragmatic factors in his ruminations on the interpretation of legal norms, my discussion here will be highlighting the insights into those factors which he advanced throughout his broader model of the workings of legal systems.  By reaffirming that the expressivism in Hart’s theory of law is focused on the pragmatics of legal discourse rather than on the semantics, I will be commending that very dimension of his theory – since expressivism as an account of the pragmatics of legal or moral discourse is powerfully astute, whereas expressivism as an account of the semantics of such discourse would be badly misguided.

4.  Expressivism as Non-cognitivism

What, then, is expressivism?  Like many other bits of philosophical parlance, the term “expressivism” is used in more than one way by philosophers.  In its most expansive sense, the term denotes any theory that contemplates the ways in which various acts of communication express the aims and attitudes of the people who perform those acts.  When expressivism is so expansively understood, it quite plainly cuts across the divide between pragmatics and semantics.  So construed, expressivism as an approach to legal or moral discourse can be focused on matters of pragmatics or on matters of semantics or on both.  When understood in this capacious fashion, expressivism is furthermore entirely consistent with the notion that beliefs and other cognitive attitudes are given voice through the statements that are characteristically made by the participants in the type of discourse or practice that is under consideration.  The contents of beliefs and other cognitive attitudes are propositions, which are evaluable as true or false.  Hence, expressivism as an approach to legal or moral discourse can fully uphold the cognitive respectability of such discourse.
	However, as Toh rightly observes, the term “expressivism” is usually employed more narrowly.  Although expressivism has sometimes been elaborated as a theory of the pragmatics of moral or legal discourse,​[4]​ it has more frequently been elaborated as a theory of the semantics of such discourse.  Moreover, it has usually been developed as a theory which holds that only conative or non-cognitive attitudes – such as desires and emotions – are given voice through the statements that are characteristically made by the participants in the discourse or practice that is under consideration.  Toh and his fellow philosophers of law have understood expressivism in exactly this fashion.  That is, they submit that an expressivist account of internal legal statements will take such statements to be expressive of non-cognitive attitudes such as desires or emotions but not of cognitive attitudes such as beliefs.  According to these philosophers, Hart as an expressivist would deny that any internal legal statement is endowed with a semantic content that goes beyond the function of the statement in giving voice to some non-cognitive attitude(s).  He would in effect maintain that every such statement is relevantly similar to other utterances whose semantic contents are filled entirely by their non-cognitive pragmatics.  In other words, every internal legal statement is relevantly similar to utterances such as “Hurray for the Boston Celtics” or “Boo to the New York Yankees” or “Wow” or “Oh boy” or “Hello” or “Shut the door.”  No such utterance is appropriately evaluable as true or false, and the meaning of each such utterance is given entirely by its expression of an emotion or a desire or some other non-cognitive attitude.  Such is the view of legal semantics which Hart propounded, according to Toh and like-minded exegetes.
	Though Toh assures his readers that “expressivists begin with the assumption that [moral and legal] discourses are in good standing, that they are not fundamentally flawed” (2005, 80), his assurances are highly misleading at best.  Toh is here submitting that expressivists as non-cognitivists do not contend that the affirmative statements advanced in moral discourse or legal discourse are systematically false.  He is contrasting the expressivists with the so-called error theorists in moral philosophy, who do contend that all ascriptions of moral obligations or of other moral properties such as goodness are false.​[5]​  However, the expressivists as non-cognitivists deviate from the error theorists on this matter simply because the expressivists hold that internal legal statements or moral statements are not truth-apt – in other words, not evaluable as true or false – at all.  Perhaps such an approach to moral or legal statements is slightly less condescending and dismissive than the error theorists’ approach, but it is hardly a very flattering account.  As Toh himself observes (2005, 95), early expressivists such as A.J. Ayer were intent on establishing that “ethical statements belong to the category of meaningless ‘pseudo-statements.’”  Admittedly, expressivists during more recent decades have moved on from the crude heavy-handedness of Ayer’s derision.  Still, anyone not already enamored of expressivism is unlikely to credit Toh’s assertion that expressivism “offers a nondebunking characterization of discursive normative practices” (2005, 81).  After all, expressivism as a non-cognitivist analysis of moral or legal discourse holds that no moral judgment or internal legal statement is ever true.  It holds that every moral judgment or internal legal statement is relevantly similar to interjections such as “Good-bye” and “Whew” or to imperatives such as “Sit down.”  Whether or not such a position is properly deemed to be an exercise in debunking, it presents moral or legal discourse as lacking in full solidity.
	In short, the version of expressivism imputed to Hart by Toh and others – expressivism as a non-cognitivist semantic doctrine – presents legal discourse in quite a disparaging light.  Consequently, we are well advised to examine carefully the considerations adduced by Toh in favor of his classification of Hart as an expressivist.  Given how firmly Hart set himself against genuine non-cognitivists like the Scandinavian Legal Realists, we should not readily accept that he in fact shared their general non-cognitivist orientation (while differing with them over the details of that orientation).  We should not readily accept that he too assigned a second-class status to legal discourse.
To be sure, Toh himself is more circumspect than some of the other legal philosophers who have classified Hart as an expressivist, and he possesses a wide-ranging knowledge of Hart’s writings.  Nonetheless, the factors marshaled by him in favor of his reading of Hart as an expressivist are remarkably weak.  Let us mull over those factors with wary eyes.

5.  Expressivism but Neither Non-cognitivism nor Semantics

As has been remarked above, expressivism of the kind on which Toh concentrates – namely, expressivism as a non-cognitivist semantic theory – is a variety within a broader class of theories.  On the one hand, there is no doubt that Hart was an expressivist of some kind.  As I have already emphasized, and as I will be emphasizing further, Hart incisively charted the attitudes or perspectives that are characteristically associated with the utterance of legal pronouncements.  On the other hand, we should be chary of assuming that his expressivism was focused on the semantics of legal pronouncements rather than solely on their pragmatics.  A fortiori, we should be chary of assuming that his expressivism unfolded as a non-cognitivist account of the semantics of those pronouncements.
	Toh therefore moves too quickly near the outset of his article when he writes that “what could be called Hart’s ‘oblique’ analysis of internal legal statements can be characterized as follows: in uttering an internal legal statement, a speaker expresses his acceptance of norms that make up the legal system.  What Hart offers then is an expressivist or noncognitivist analysis of internal legal statements” (2005, 76-7, footnote omitted).  Toh is here using the phrase “expressivist or noncognitivist” appositionally rather than as a genuine disjunction.  That is, he here takes “expressivist” and “noncognitivist” to be interchangeable terms.  However, although the first sentence in this quotation is undoubtedly correct, it does not provide any warrant for the conclusion that is inferred by Toh in the second sentence.  Hart surely did maintain that internal legal statements are expressive of attitudes of commitment, but the fact that he was an expressivist in that broad sense is per se no basis for concluding that he regarded the aforementioned statements as unexpressive of any cognitive contents.

6.  The Disavowed Early Work: A First Example

Hart in a few of his very early writings did propound some non-cognitivist analyses of the contents of certain internal legal statements (Hart 1949; 1983, chap. 1).  Hence, if Toh and his fellow exegetes were training their attention solely on those very early writings, their characterization of Hart as a proponent of non-cognitivism would be largely accurate.  However, such a characterization would be peculiarly uninteresting – because Hart explicitly repudiated those writings in his later work.  In any event, Toh has decidedly not trained his attention solely on those very early articles.  Rather, he knows that Hart disavowed them, and he is concerned mainly with Hart as the author of The Concept of Law and subsequent publications.  Still, while acknowledging that Hart dissociated himself squarely from his brief non-cognitivist phase, Toh proceeds oddly and unsatisfactorily when coming to grips with Hart’s renunciation of that phase.
	Particularly strange is the way in which Toh deals with Hart’s firm recantation of the non-cognitivist strand of his 1953 article “Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence.”  When Hart included that article three decades later in his collection Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy, he used his introductory overview to state unequivocally that he had erred in 1953 by suggesting that ascriptions of legal rights and duties are devoid of any cognitive contents (1983, 2, 4-5).  As he aptly indicated, his mistake had lain in his failure to differentiate between the pragmatic aspects and the semantic aspects of utterances – and in his consequent neglect of the semantic aspects.  He self-chidingly avowed that “had I commanded at the time of writing [‘Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence’] in 1953 the seminal distinction between the ‘meaning’ and the ‘force’ of utterances,…I should not have claimed that statements of legal rights and duties were not ‘descriptive’” (1983, 2).
	While granting that Hart abandoned the specifics of the analysis of internal legal statements which he had furnished in his 1953 essay, Toh quite startlingly asserts that Hart nevertheless continued to adhere to the very element of that essay which Hart in fact resolutely abjured: “But Hart does remain committed to a more general conclusion that he draws in [‘Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence’]: that the statements that enunciate and apply rules, including legal statements, constitute a special form of nondescriptive speech-acts” (Toh 2005, 99).  In a footnote, Toh accepts that his claim about Hart’s continued embrace of the non-cognitivist tenor of “Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence” is glaringly inconsistent with Hart’s own forthright rejection of that very feature of the 1953 essay.  Still, while acknowledging the manifest inconsistency, Toh does nothing to mitigate it: “I must concede that what I say here seems inconsistent with Hart’s remarks in the introduction to Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy disowning his claim in [‘Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence’] that conclusions of legal reasoning are nondescriptive.  I find Hart’s general discussion surrounding these remarks very confusing and the remarks themselves particularly baffling – especially given that Hart says elsewhere in the same introduction that he considers Austin’s work on performatives to be of permanent value for analytical jurisprudence” (2005, 99 n40, parenthetical citations omitted).
Toh’s bafflement is itself baffling.  Hart esteemed the twentieth-century philosopher J.L. Austin not only because of Austin’s meticulous charting of the pragmatics of speech-acts but also because of his alertness to the distinction between the pragmatics and the semantics of utterances.  That distinction is precisely what Hart in 1983 reproached himself for having neglected three decades earlier; as he said in 1983, he would never have embraced non-cognitivism if he had properly apprehended the contrast between pragmatics and semantics.  Had he possessed a command of that contrast in his early years, he would have grasped that the conative pragmatic aspects of attributions of rights and duties – crucial and salient though they are, of course – are perfectly consistent with the fact that the contents of those attributions are propositional.  Toh, through his puzzlement over this straightforward insight articulated by the later Hart, is in effect repeating the error of the early Hart.  Toh is presuming that someone who perceptively highlights the conative pragmatics of certain types of utterances is committed to the view that utterances of those types are devoid of any cognitive semantic contents.

7.  The Disavowed Early Work: A Second Example

Another instance of Hart’s disavowal of his very early non-cognitivist phase occurred in his preface to the 1968 collection of his essays on the philosophy of criminal law, Punishment and Responsibility.  He there explained why he was omitting from the collection his essay “The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights” – an essay published in 1949, near the inception of his non-cognitivist phase.  Hart declared: “My reason for excluding it is simply that its main contentions no longer seem to me defensible, and that the main criticisms of it made in recent years are justified” (1968, v).  In a footnote, Hart signaled his agreement with the criticisms made by Peter Geach in a classic article that was directed not only against Hart but also more broadly against the whole non-cognitivist enterprise (Geach 1960).
	Toh candidly avouches that “I do not believe that the apparent inconsistency between Hart’s disowning of his [non-cognitivism] and what I consider his adherence to expressivism can be eliminated” (2005, 102).  He somewhat patronizingly adds: “It may be that Hart never realized the full implications of Geach’s criticisms” (2005, 102-3).  At any rate, after some brief reflections that include a passage by Hart to which I shall turn shortly, Toh again frankly concedes that “I have not explained away the apparent inconsistency between Hart’s disowning of [non-cognitivism] and what I consider his continued espousal of an expressivist analysis of internal legal statements” (2005, 105).
	Of course, the obvious way of eliminating any inconsistency between Hart’s positions is to conclude that Toh has fallen into error by supposing that Hart continued to espouse a non-cognitivist understanding of internal legal statements past the early stage of his career.  At the very least, the passages in which Hart disowningly looked askance at any such understanding are such as to militate strongly against Toh’s reading of The Concept of Law (and of Hart’s other late-period writings).  Given that Hart emphatically rejected the position imputed to him by Toh, we should not accept Toh’s reading unless there are cogent considerations in favor of it.  So far, the considerations which we have probed are exceedingly feeble.  As will become apparent, the remaining factors adduced by Toh or by like-minded exegetes are similarly unavailing.

8.  Different Senses of “Non-cognitive”

Toh himself is sufficiently careful to observe that “Hart and Raz, whose characterizations of Hart’s position will serve as some of the evidence I will rely on, use the terms ‘noncognitive’ and ‘expressive’ to characterize a number of philosophical positions that one or both attribute to Hart….But only some of these views overlap with my versions of expressivism and noncognitivism” (2005, 78 n6).  However, not all of Toh’s fellow exegetes are comparably circumspect.  Stephen Perry, for example, announces that “Hart explicitly states that he accepts a noncognitivist analysis of legal statements” (2009, 310 n53).  In support of his assertion, Perry cites the closing pages of Hart’s essay on legal duty and obligation (Hart 1982, 158-61).  One minor point is that the term “noncognitivist” does not in fact appear in Hart’s essay at all.  Instead, Hart used the term “non-cognitive” – which should alert any readers to the fact that Hart was not there addressing the matters that are at issue in debates over non-cognitivism as an account of the semantics of legal or moral statements.  Rather, he was engaged in a dispute with Raz over the concept of legal duty or obligation.  Raz believes that the concept of duty or obligation is the same in legal discourse as in moral discourse, and he therefore believes that all invocations of legal duties by officials in support of their endeavors of law-application imply the existence of moral reasons for people to conform to those duties.  Hart disagreed with Raz over the notion that a single concept of obligation is shared between legal discourse and moral discourse, and also over the concomitant thesis about the implications of any justificatory references to legal duties by officials.  Hart denied that all such references imply that the addressees thereof have had moral reasons to fulfill the duties.  He labeled Raz’s position on that point of contention as “cognitive” and his own position as “non-cognitive.”  Although those labels may have been unhelpfully misleading, Hart did not adopt them to signal his allegiance to any general non-cognitivist account of the semantics of internal legal statements.  He was instead focused on the point of contention that has just been singled out here.  That is, he was contesting Raz’s view that every official pronouncement which invokes and applies a legal obligation is implying that there are moral reasons for each addressee of the pronouncement to conform to its terms.  Someone can endorse and amplify and refine Hart’s position on that matter – as I have done elsewhere (Kramer 1999, chap. 4) – while giving a very wide berth to the suggestion that internal legal statements generally are devoid of propositional contents.

9.  Naturalistic Preoccupations?

As has been observed in §2 of this paper, the proponents of philosophical naturalism contend that the only real entities and properties are those which are causally efficacious.  Although there is no relationship of entailment in either direction between that metaphysical thesis and a non-cognitivist account of the semantics of moral or legal discourse, the two are very often combined.  As Toh observes (2005, 80-1), numerous devotees of naturalism have embraced non-cognitivism in order to avoid the conclusion that sundry statements uttered in moral or legal discourse – statements such as ascriptions of duties and rights – are propositional assertions that affirm the existence of numerous unreal entities and properties.  Consequently, Toh thinks that his attribution of non-cognitivism to Hart will be strengthened if he can establish that Hart shared the metaphysical convictions of naturalists.
	Toh seizes upon the passages in the ninth chapter of The Concept of Law where Hart warily expounded the Aristotelian conception of nature – a strongly teleological conception which Hart perceived as underlying the theories of classical natural-law philosophers.  Toh quotes Hart’s remark that the Aristotelian “outlook is, in many ways, antithetic to the general conception of nature which constitutes the framework of modern secular thought” (Hart 1994, 186, quoted in Toh 2005, 84).  Let us leave aside here the fact that Hart in his overall discussion of Aristotelian teleology was more sympathetic than might be inferred from the sentence which Toh quotes in isolation.  Even if Hart had distanced himself from Aristotelianism more sharply than he did, we could not validly have inferred therefrom that he subscribed to the naturalistic thesis about the unreality of causally inefficacious entities and properties.  Aristotelian teleology is scarcely the sole alternative to that naturalistic thesis.  Very few of the present-day moral realists who reject naturalism are partisans of any classical teleological conception of nature.
	Toh quotes some other sentences from Hart that might seem to bespeak a naturalistic orientation.  He reports that, after launching an initial salvo of objections to theories that construe invocations of legal norms as predictions of the imposition of sanctions, Hart broached some worries that might be felt by the critics of such theories.  Toh (2005, 83) quotes most of the following passage from the opening chapter of The Concept of Law (1994, 11, emphasis in original):
Yet among critics who have pressed these objections to the predictive account [of norms and obligations] some confess that there is something obscure here; something which resists analysis in clear, hard, factual terms.  What can there be in a rule apart from regular and hence predictable punishment or reproof of those who deviate from the usual patterns of conduct, which distinguishes it from a mere group habit?  Can there really be something over and above these clear ascertainable facts, some extra element, which guides the judge and justifies or gives him a reason for punishing?
Toh then declares that “Hart says that we may be tempted to ‘imagine there is something external, some invisible part of the fabric of the universe guiding and controlling us in these activities’” (Toh 2005, 83, quoting Hart 1994, 11-12).  Toh tells his readers that “Hart himself resists this temptation.  And his resistance is motivated by a desire to have an account of…legal discourse that is congruent with the naturalistic conception of the world that he shares with other expressivists” (2005, 84).  Toh proceeds to refer to Hart’s doubts about the teleological conception of nature in classical natural-law theories, which I have already discussed near the outset of this subsection.
	Toh has badly misrepresented the early portion of The Concept of Law from which he quotes.  In that portion, Hart was recounting the ideas and concerns of some of the extreme rule-skeptics whom he would go on to criticize in the seventh chapter of his text.  The questions included in the relatively long passage quoted just above were not questions posed by Hart; rather, they were questions posed by the extreme rule-skeptics whom Hart was discussing.  He was using free indirect discourse to give voice to the worries of those rule-skeptics even though he did not share their worries.  Moreover, in the sentence that contains the extravagant wording about “some invisible part of the fabric of the universe,” Hart was not expressing a temptation felt by himself or likely to be felt by his readers.  Instead, he was continuing to articulate the ideas and concerns of some extreme rule-skeptics whose outlook he did not share.  According to those rule-skeptics, ordinary people are inclined to think of legal norms in ways that are well captured by the aforementioned extravagant wording.  Rule-skeptics respond with equal extravagance by denying the reality or constrainingness of legal norms altogether.
	Hart in his own voice replied to the rule-skeptical position not by endorsing any naturalistic dogmas about the unreality of causally inefficacious entities or properties (pace Toh), but by indicating that the anxiety of rule-skeptics over the reality of legal norms is something that “calls for further elucidation of the distinction between social rules and mere convergent habits of behaviour.  This distinction is crucial for the understanding of law, and much of the early chapters of this book is concerned with it” (1994, 12).  In sum, Hart replied to the anxiety of the rule-skeptics by underscoring the importance of a refined understanding of the behavioral and attitudinal conditions that are constitutive of legal norms or of other social norms.  That reply paralleled his response later in his book to theories which hold that ascriptions of legal obligations are predictions of the imposition of legal sanctions.  Hart remarked that such theories, associated with Bentham and Austin above all, had been hailed by some legal theorists “as the only alternative to metaphysical conceptions of obligation or duty as invisible objects mysteriously existing ‘above’ or ‘behind’ the world of ordinary, observable facts.  But there are many reasons for rejecting this interpretation of statements of obligation as predictions, and it is not, in fact, the only alternative to obscure metaphysics” (1994, 84).  Hart of course maintained that the preferable alternative lies in the careful elucidation of the patterns of behavior and attitudes that constitute the existence of legal obligations.  Toh asserts that “[a]n expressivist analysis of internal legal statements is the third alternative Hart has in mind, and that is what he proposes in The Concept of Law” (2005, 85).  If “expressivist” were being used here in its expansive sense, then Toh’s assertion would be unexceptionable.  Hart did indeed contend that the conditions for the existence of legal obligations reside in certain social practices through which the officials who run a system of governance express their acceptance of the laws that impose the obligations.  However, Toh is quite clearly using “expressivist” not in its capacious sense but in its narrower sense to denote a non-cognitivist analysis of the semantics of internal legal statements.  Given as much, his assertion is baseless.  Neither when impugning the proclamations of rule-skeptics nor when impugning the predictive theory of obligations did Hart resort to non-cognitivism by suggesting that internal legal statements are devoid of any cognitive contents.  Similarly, he did not resort to any naturalistic dogmas about the unreality of causally inefficacious properties and entities.  Instead, he accentuated the need for the project in which he was engaged: namely, the project of distilling the patterns of behavior and attitudes that constitute the phenomena (legal norms and legal obligations and so forth) which are invoked in internal legal statements.  He regarded that project as the best antidote to the rule-skepticism that has often nihilistically “taken the extreme form of condemning the very notion of a binding rule as confused or fictitious” (1994, 12).
	To be sure, as I have remarked in §2 of this article, Hart wrote The Concept of Law and his other works at a time before minimalist accounts of truth and reality had become as prominent and influential as they are today.  Consequently, he did not draw overtly on any such account.  However, had he written in later decades, he would very likely have been attracted to minimalism because it is so congenial to his project.  Faced with skepticism about the reality of legal norms or with efforts to reduce legal obligations to high probabilities of sanctions, Hart retorted by highlighting the salutariness of coming up with precise and illuminating analyses of the social practices in which legal norms and obligations are constituted.  Those practices are structured and guided by legal norms and obligations that in turn are constituted by them.  Had Hart had at his disposal a minimalist conception of truth and reality – broadly along the lines which I have laconically sketched in §2 and defended at much greater length elsewhere – he could have marshaled it explicitly in the service of his jurisprudential enterprise.  Indeed, even though he did not have such a conception readily at his disposal, he can fairly be read as having adopted a minimalist approach avant la lettre.  Responding as he did to skepticism about the reality or irreducibility of legal norms and obligations, he aligned himself with the central insight of minimalism.  In other words, he grasped that the following two questions are equivalent: the question whether a legal prohibition on some mode of conduct MC in any jurisdiction J is real, and the question whether MC is legally prohibited in J.  Hart and proponents of minimalism would agree that, if we aim to know whether such a legal prohibition really exists in J, we need to ascertain whether any conditions sufficient to constitute that prohibition are present in J or not.  By the reckoning of a positivist such as Hart, of course, those conditions consist fundamentally in certain patterns of behavior and attitudes.  Having detected such patterns, we might also need to engage in some moral judgments – if the system of governance in J includes moral principles among its criteria for legal validity – but no reflections on metaphysical abstrusities will be at all relevant.

10.  The Analysis Attributed to Hart

A few pages in the sixth chapter of The Concept of Law, on the Rule of Recognition, have been of particular importance for exegetes who attribute to Hart a non-cognitivist analysis of internal legal statements.  Those pages are cited frequently by Shapiro in his meditations on the matter (2006, 1168-70), and they are likewise central to Toh’s delineation of Hart’s position.  In that much-scrutinized portion of his text, Hart strove to differentiate between internal statements and moderately external statements.  More specifically, he there emphasized that the statements made by the officials in a system of governance as they rely on their Rule of Recognition for the identification of the system’s laws are different from the statements made by an observer who reports that the specified Rule of Recognition is operative within the jurisdiction.  As Hart wrote in one of the relevant passages (1994, 102):
The use of unstated rules of recognition, by courts and others, in identifying particular rules of the system is characteristic of the internal point of view.  Those who use them in this way thereby manifest their own acceptance of them as guiding rules….This attitude of shared acceptance of rules is to be contrasted with that of an observer who records ab extra the fact that a social group accepts such rules but does not himself accept them.
On the basis of the first two sentences in this quoted passage, Toh attributes to Hart the following account of internal legal statements: “Let R be the norm that a speaker considers the rule of recognition of the legal system in his community….The speaker makes a legal statement [if and only if] he: (i) expresses his acceptance of R; and (ii) presupposes that R is generally accepted and complied with by the members of his community” (2005, 88).  I henceforth designate this analysis, which Toh imputes to Hart, as “AH.”
	Though Toh believes that AH is a promising point of departure, he allows that it is not satisfactory as it stands.  He indicates that he is “only defending it as a reconstruction of Hart’s proposal” (2005, 90).  However, AH is exegetically and philosophically problematic in ways that go undescried by Toh.  Furthermore, his discussion of AH is itself defective.  I will proceed here to show the following points: AH does not correspond to what Hart wrote in the very passage which Toh quotes as the basis for his imputation of AH to Hart; AH suffers from a profound flaw which Toh does not glimpse; the flaw which Toh does perceive in AH is not in fact present therein; and, even if the attribution of AH to Hart were correct, it would not in itself support the claim that he propounded a non-cognitivist analysis of the semantics of legal discourse.
	Whereas the first prong of AH refers simply to expressing one’s acceptance of R, Hart in the quoted passage (and elsewhere) referred to manifesting one’s acceptance of R by using it to identify other laws of one’s system of governance.  Even though we should assume that Toh is employing the term “acceptance” in Hart’s somewhat technical sense to denote the adoption of all three elements of the critical reflective attitude toward R, many utterances can fulfill the first prong of AH without using R to identify other laws.  Here we can behold the major shortcoming in AH which Toh overlooks.  Let us suppose that Susan in the jurisdiction of the United States believes that the content of the prevailing Rule of Recognition is equivalent to the content of the American Constitution.  Susan’s belief is mistakenly simplistic, but for present purposes the correctness or incorrectness of her beliefs about the content of R does not matter.  Now suppose that Susan exclaims “Hurray for the American Constitution!”  In combination with various other utterances of hers, that exclamation expresses her acceptance of what she takes to be the generally prevailing Rule of Recognition in her jurisdiction.  Hence, AH classifies her exclamation “Hurray for the American Constitution” as an internal legal statement.  Such a classification reveals not only that AH is inadequate as an account of the nature of internal legal statements, but also that Toh has erred in ascribing AH to Hart.  Unlike Toh’s formulation of AH, the remarks in the passage which Toh quotes from Hart would not classify “Hurray for the American Constitution” as an internal legal statement.
	Notwithstanding the serious shortcomings of AH as an exposition of the nature of internal legal statements, it does not suffer from the defect which Toh perceives in it.  In response to a posited objection, he concedes that “it is implausible to think, as [AH] implies, that every internal legal statement involves the speaker’s appeal to what he considers the rule of recognition of his legal system” (2005, 90).  Before we consider why AH is not afflicted by the problem which Toh broaches, we should note that Hart himself – in the passage which Toh quotes from him, and everywhere else – never suggested that all internal legal statements are focused on the identification of laws.  Many such statements are indeed so focused, but many others are concerned chiefly instead with the matter of applying various laws to sundry circumstances; utterances of the latter kind frequently take for granted the identification of the laws that are brought to bear on those circumstances.  Statements of law-application are internal legal statements, just as are statements of law-ascertainment.  Accordingly, if AH implied otherwise, we would have further grounds for denying that AH is an adequate analysis of internal legal statements – and further grounds for denying that AH encapsulates Hart’s understanding of such statements.
	In fact, however, AH is not marred by the weakness which Toh imputes to it.  Let us first note, in my most recent quotation from Toh, the ambiguity of his wording about “the speaker’s appeal to what he considers the rule of recognition.”  Toh never disambiguates that wording.  If it means that the speaker explicitly resorts to the criteria of the perceived Rule of Recognition, then the first prong of AH does not imply that any such appeal is involved in every internal legal statement.  Only if the phrase “expresses his acceptance of R” in the first prong of AH were to be construed very narrowly to encompass nothing short of explicit references to the Rule of Recognition, would such an implication follow.  Yet, if the first prong of AH were construed so narrowly, it would be flagrantly inaccurate as an encapsulation of Hart’s conception of internal legal statements.  Hart repeatedly and emphatically denied that explicit invocations of the prevailing Rule of Recognition are operative in all internal legal statements (1994, 101-3).  Even in the pronouncements uttered by officials during processes of law-ascertainment, and a fortiori in the pronouncements uttered by officials during processes of law-application, most internal legal statements do not involve such explicit invocations of the Rule of Recognition.  As Hart wrote: “For the most part the rule of recognition is not stated, but its existence is shown in the way in which particular rules are identified, either by courts or other officials or private persons or their advisers” (1994, 101, emphasis in original).  Thus, if the first prong of AH is to bear any resemblance to Hart’s conception of internal legal statements, the phrase “expresses his acceptance of R” therein has to be construed expansively to encompass instances of implicit reliance on R as well as explicit invocations of R.  When that phrase is construed in an appropriately expansive fashion, however, AH does not imply that every internal legal statement involves some explicit recourse by officials to the criteria of the perceived Rule of Recognition.
	Let us therefore suppose that Toh with his wording about “the speaker’s appeal” has in mind not only explicit or conscious references to the criteria of the Rule of Recognition, but also instances of implicit or unreflective reliance on those criteria.  In that event, he is correct in thinking that AH implies that every internal legal statement involves some such appeal.  He errs, however, in thinking that that implication of AH is implausible.  Every internal legal statement does indeed involve reliance by the speaker on the criteria in the perceived Rule of Recognition, whether the reliance be explicit or implicit.  This point is especially obvious in connection with statements of law-ascertainment – the sorts of statements with which Hart was concerned in the passage which Toh quotes as the basis for his attribution of AH to Hart – but it also extends to statements of law-application.  Every instance of law-application rests implicitly if not explicitly on the proposition that each norm implemented as a law is endowed with the status of a law under the criteria in the prevailing Rule of Recognition.  Either the norm in question is directly validated as a law by those criteria, or else it is directly validated by some other laws that are themselves ultimately validated by the criteria in the Rule of Recognition.  Hence, indirect and implicit though the reliance of speakers on the criteria of the Rule of Recognition may be in any number of internal legal statements (especially in statements of law-application but also in statements of law-ascertainment), some such reliance – be it implicit or explicit – is always involved in the utterance of any such statement.  Of course, as has been pointed out in note 1 above, the fact that the officials in a system of governance are guided by the standards in their Rule of Recognition does not per se mean that they are able to articulate each of those standards with any precision.  Still, whether or not the officials can articulate all of those standards with precision, their being guided by the standards is something that explicitly or implicitly underlies every one of their internal legal statements.
	Let us finally notice that, even if the failings of AH and the failings of Toh’s discussion of AH are put aside, the attribution of AH to Hart does not suffice to vindicate the claim that Hart propounded a non-cognitivist analysis of the semantics of internal legal statements.  The two prongs of AH distill the pragmatic aspects of internal legal statements which earmark the internal viewpoint as a perspective that contrasts with the external viewpoint and simulative viewpoint respectively.  Whereas the first prong of AH captures an aspect of internal legal statements that distinguishes them from external legal statements and simulative legal statements, the second prong of AH captures an aspect of internal legal statements that distinguishes them from simulative legal statements.​[6]​  A distillation of those pragmatic aspects of internal legal utterances is entirely consistent with the thesis that all or most such utterances are endowed with propositional contents.  Consequently, even if Toh had been correct in ascribing AH to Hart, he would not have provided any support for his broader claim that Hart embraced non-cognitivism as an account of the semantics of internal legal statements.

11.  An Aberrant Passage

There are no passages in The Concept of Law that militate in favor of Toh’s reading of Hart as a non-cognitivist, but somewhat more problematic is a passage in an encyclopedia entry by Hart that was published in 1967.  In the relevant portion of that entry, Hart briefly pondered whether decisions which apply legal norms to particular circumstances can properly be modeled as deductive inferences.  According to extreme non-cognitivists, neither any general legal norms nor any concrete conclusions about the legal bearings of particular instances of conduct are ever aptly evaluable as true or false.  Because those norms and conclusions are not truth-apt – that is, because they are devoid of propositional contents – they cannot ever serve as the steps in any genuinely deductive arguments.  Such was the extreme non-cognitivist view which Hart disdainfully rejected.  Justified though he was in dismissing that view brusquely, however, his way of doing so was disconcerting (1983, 100):
This view depends on a restrictive definition, in terms of truth and falsehood, of the notion of a valid deductive inference and of logical relations such as consistency and contradiction.  This would exclude from the scope of deductive inference not only legal rules or statements of law but also commands and many other sentential forms which are commonly regarded as susceptible of logical relations and as constituents of valid deductive arguments.  Although considerable technical complexities are involved, several more general definitions of the idea of valid deductive inference that render the notion applicable to inferences the constituents of which are not characterized as either true or false have now been worked out by logicians.  In what follows, as in most of contemporary jurisprudential literature, the general acceptability of this more generalized definition of valid inference is assumed.
In other words, Hart reacted to the extreme non-cognitivist view not by affirming that many legal norms and concrete legal conclusions are truth-apt, but by contending that deductive argumentation can be put together with components that are not truth-apt.  He appeared to concede that legal norms and concrete legal conclusions are never truth-apt, and – amazingly, in light of his critique of Austin – he grouped together all such norms and conclusions with commands as entities that are not truth-apt.  (Commands, qua imperatives such as “Shut the door,” are indeed not evaluable as true or false.)
	What should be said about this excerpt from an encyclopedia article that was published after The Concept of Law and long after Hart’s flirtation with non-cognitivism in his very early writings?  Should the excerpt lead us to conclude that Hart continued to embrace non-cognitivism in his later jurisprudential writings?  One thing to be noted is that, as Toh remarks, (2005, 104), the logicians to whom Hart referred in the penultimate sentence of this quoted passage very likely included Georg Henrik von Wright and Richard Hare – each of whom developed a version of deontic logic that excludes the possibility of conflicts between duties.  (Each of those philosophers misguidedly effected that exclusion by conflating the conditions under which duty-imposing norms are operative and the conditions under which duty-imposing norms are fulfilled.​[7]​)  In an essay on Kelsen originally published in 1968, Hart wisely recognized that conflicts between legal duties are in fact perfectly possible (1983, 325-7).  Given as much, his allegiance to the ideas propounded by von Wright and Hare was obviously very tenuous.
	Furthermore, any concession to non-cognitivism in the quoted passage may have been made by Hart purely arguendo.  After all, his purpose in broaching the matter was to brush aside the extreme non-cognitivist claim that legal norms and concrete legal statements cannot ever serve as premises and conclusions in deductive arguments.  For that purpose, he may have elected to grant arguendo one of the chief assumptions of the extreme non-cognitivists – their assumption that legal norms and concrete legal statements are never true or false – even while he assailed the inference which they drew therefrom.  By so doing, Hart could keep on board any readers who subscribe to that underlying assumption about truth-inaptitude.  Of course, given that the versions of deontic logic to which he adverted are seriously flawed in the way which I have indicated, Hart’s invocation of them against the extreme non-cognitivists was unwise.  However, my point here is not that Hart was well advised to retort to the extreme non-cognitivists as he did.  My point is simply that his acquiescence in their assumption about the truth-inaptitude of legal norms and concrete legal statements may have been purely tactical.
	Each of the foregoing two considerations is strengthened by what I have recounted in §7 of this article.  As has been discussed there, Hart in 1968 publicly announced his concurrence with Geach’s 1960 critique of non-cognitivist approaches to the semantics of normative discourse.  That critique, which took exception to Hart’s early work on ascriptions of responsibility, was directed precisely against the non-cognitivist thesis that formulations of ethical judgments or other normative judgments are never evaluable as true or false.  It was directed against Hare as much as against Hart.  We cannot know exactly when Hart rid himself of his early views (by learning of Geach’s objections or perhaps even before learning of those objections), but we can safely presume that that intellectual evolution occurred long before the 1967 publication of his entry in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy.  Thus, we should be loath to take at face value a passing remark in his entry that might seem to smack of the non-cognitivism which he had abandoned.
	Worth noting also are two further points.  First, the riposte by Hart to the extreme non-cognitivists was a fleeting preliminary to his discussion of legal reasoning in his encyclopedia entry on problems in the philosophy of law.  It hardly stands as a well-considered account of the semantics of internal legal statements.  Second, in line with what I have reported in §8 above, Hart maintained that some laws and some concrete legal statements (especially in evil systems of governance) are best analyzed as imperatives.  His apparent concession to the non-cognitivists would be appropriate in connection with those exceptional laws and statements, even though it would not be germane to most laws and concrete legal statements.
	Admittedly, none of the considerations advanced here is quite sufficient to eliminate completely the disconcertingness of the remarks by Hart in the quoted passage.  Even so, when that passage is set alongside the numerous passages in his other late-period work where he differentiated clearly between the semantics and the pragmatics of legal statements, the case for classifying him as a non-cognitivist in The Concept of Law and in later writings is remarkably weak.  Still, to say as much is not to say that he presented a cognitivist account of the semantics of internal legal statements in any sustained and rigorous fashion.  Although I have sought to counter Toh’s understanding of Hart as a non-cognitivist, I have not suggested that Hart’s abandonment of his early non-cognitivism was accompanied by his development of a methodically worked-out alternative to his early views.  Nevertheless, there are enough passages in The Concept of Law and his other late-period writings to enable a modest reconstruction of his approach to the semantics of internal legal statements.  We should now turn to that approach, in a brief conclusion to my discussion of this matter.

12.  The Semantics of Internal Legal Statements

As has been noted, the class of internal legal statements comprises both law-ascertaining pronouncements and law-applying pronouncements.  Hart supplied some moderately clear indications of the semantics of law-ascertaining assertions.  He was particularly expansive in the following passage (1994, 103):
[T]he word “valid” is most frequently, though not always, used in just such internal statements, applying to a particular rule of a legal system, an unstated but accepted rule of recognition.  To say that a given rule is valid is to recognize it as passing all the tests provided by the rule of recognition and so as a rule of the system.  We can indeed simply say that the statement that a particular rule is valid means that it satisfies all the criteria provided by the rule of recognition.  This is incorrect only to the extent that it might obscure the internal character of such statements; for, like the cricketers’ “Out,” these statements of validity normally apply to a particular case a rule of recognition accepted by the speaker and others, rather than expressly state that the rule is satisfied.
Several pages later, Hart declared afresh that an affirmation of the existence of a legal norm by an official engaged in an endeavor of law-ascertainment is “an internal statement applying an accepted but unstated rule of recognition and meaning (roughly) no more than ‘valid given the system’s criteria of validity’” (1994, 110).
	As is made clear by these remarks, Hart firmly grasped that the semantic contents of any law-ascertaining statements are irreducibly normative.  In that respect, his remarks about such statements are at one with his attacks on predictive theories of law.  For example, near the end of his rejoinders to the jurisprudential theory propounded by the Danish legal philosopher Alf Ross, Hart submitted that “[t]he temptation to misrepresent…internal statements in which use is made of an unstated, accepted rule or criterion of recognition as an external statement of fact predicting the regular operation of the system is due to the fact that the general acceptance of the rules and efficacy of the system is indeed the normal context in which such internal normative statements are made….But this normal context of efficacy presupposed in the making of internal statements must be distinguished from their normative meaning or content” (1983, 168, emphases in original).  At this juncture as elsewhere in his late-period writings, Hart differentiated carefully between the pragmatics of internal legal utterances and their normative semantics.
	How, then, should we construe the account of legal semantics that is operative in these passages and in other similar passages?  Partisans of the non-cognitivist reading of Hart will doubtless seek to contend that the normative meaning or content to which he referred is a matter of the expression of normative attitudes.  Such philosophers might seize upon the following bit of Hart’s essay on Ross, which occurs shortly after the portion that I have just quoted: “It is therefore vital if we are to understand social rules and the normative uses of language which are an inseparable part of this complex phenomenon of social life not to accept Ross’s dilemma: ‘Either construe these as predictions of judicial behaviour and feelings or as metaphysical assertions about unobservable entities above the world of facts’” (1983, 168).  Champions of the non-cognitivist interpretation of Hart will be apt to think that he continued to embrace non-cognitivism in his later work as an alternative to the crudities of predictive theories and to obscure metaphysics.  Propagators of that interpretation, such as Toh and Shapiro, do indeed insistently presume that Hart cast his lot with naturalism.  After all, as has been observed in §9 of this paper, naturalistic worries about the reality of normative entities and properties have always been one of the main factors behind the development of non-cognitivist approaches to the semantics of normative discourses.
	However, naturalism is scarcely the lone alternative to obscure metaphysics.  As should be evident from my discussions of minimalism earlier in this paper, a minimalist account of the reality of legal entities and properties – or of the reality of ethical entities and properties – does not confront us with any metaphysical arcana.  Instead, it confronts us with the substantive legal matters or substantive ethical matters with which we have begun.  By the reckoning of any minimalist account, the following two questions are equivalent: the question whether any legal prohibition on acts of arson in England really exists, and the question whether acts of arson in England are legally prohibited.  Metaphysical questions about the reality of substantive legal norms are construed by minimalism as substantive legal questions.
	As I have argued already, Hart’s inclinations in The Concept of Law and in his other late writings were along the lines of minimalism rather than along the lines of naturalism and reductionism.  Though Hart could not avail himself directly of the minimalist approaches to truth and factuality and reality that have been elaborated since his retirement and death, he proceeded very much in accordance with those approaches.  Consequently, one of the principal worries that have prompted many philosophers to develop their non-cognitivist accounts of the semantics of moral or legal discourse – the worry of naturalists about the inclusion of causally inefficacious normative entities and properties in a tally of what really exists –  was not shared by him.
Proceeding in a minimalist fashion, Hart could avoid any recondite metaphysics while also avoiding the severe problems that afflict expressivism as a non-cognitivist semantic doctrine.  He in his later work was certainly aware of one of the most formidable such problems, for attention was drawn to it by Geach’s critique of non-cognitivism to which I have referred in §7 above – a critique which Hart endorsed in his repudiation of his own early work – and by a further article that Geach published in 1965.​[8]​  Because the difficulty exposed by Geach is discussed by Toh (2005, 102-4), and because my primary concern throughout has been to contest the classification of Hart as a non-cognitivist rather than to establish the untenability of non-cognitivism as a semantic doctrine, I shall not expound the aforementioned difficulty here.  Suffice it to say that the efforts by non-cognitivists to resolve that difficulty have run afoul of the conflation which I have condemnatorily mentioned in §11 of this paper: the conflation of the existence-conditions and the fulfillment-conditions of duty-imposing norms.​[9]​  Hart in his later writings could escape such cruxes by eschewing the non-cognitivist semantics which he had espoused in some of his very early publications.  In those later writings, he grasped that the semantic contents of any number of internal legal statements are normative propositions which refer to normative entities and properties that are to be construed minimalistically.  (Again, I am not suggesting that Hart himself presented his theorizing overtly in these terms.  My claim, rather, is that we can best make sense of the analyses in The Concept of Law and in his other late-period writings if we construe them in these terms.)
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^1	 When I say that the actions and dispositions are oriented toward the rules and guided by them, I am not implying that all or most of the competent users of the relevant language would be able to articulate the rules in any precise fashion.  Without being able to formulate the rules in such a fashion, people can be guided by them through steady adherence to them.  One adheres to the rules not only through one’s implicit applications of them in one’s own utterances, but also through one’s tendency to recognize when they have been contravened by others.
^2	 Insofar as Hart took such a position on this matter, I firmly dissent from his view.  See Kramer 2009, chap. 2.
^3	 For my principal expositions of minimalism, see Kramer 2007, 71-82; 2009, 200-7, 261-88.  I there draw quite heavily though not uncritically on Horwich 1998 as well as on other sources.
^4	 For an expressivist account of the pragmatics of moral discourse – an account which I take to be largely a distillation of some elements of Simon Blackburn’s expressivism – see Kramer 2017, 198-206.  For a recent article that appears to be advocating an expressivist approach to the pragmatics of legal discourse, see Etchemendy 2016.
^5	 For the locus classicus of the error theory of morality, see Mackie 1977, chap. 1.  For a sustained critique of the error theory, see Kramer 2017, 186-96.
^6	 For some elucidation of the nature of simulative statements, see Kramer 1999, 165-6; 2018, chap. 3.  Admittedly, some simulative legal statements do presuppose the general efficacy of R.  However, whereas every internal legal statement is endowed with such a presupposition, some simulative legal statements are not.
^7	 That disastrous conflation was also characteristic of Bentham’s so-called logic of the will; see Hart 1982, 111-17.  For a full exposition of the possibility of moral conflicts, with ripostes to the likes of von Wright and Hare, see Kramer 2014, 1-19.
^8	 Geach 1965.  For a good discussion of the problem highlighted by Geach, see Kalderon 2005, chap. 2.  For my own discussion of various related matters, see Kramer 2009, chap. 8.
^9	 That conflation is palpable, for example, in Blackburn 1993, chap. 10.  In his later writings, Blackburn has given a wide berth to expressivism as a semantic doctrine and has subscribed instead to expressivism as an account of the pragmatics of ethical discourse.  See Kramer 2017, 202-8.
